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Dr. Michael Heesters, PharmD*
INTRODUCTION
“Data mining” is a term used to describe “the process of discovering
interesting patterns in databases that are useful in decision making.” 1 Data
mining firms collect information, which is then resold to other companies
for use in their business. As competition between firms in all areas of the
economy increases, the need “to identify innovative ways to capture and
enhance market shares while reducing cost” becomes more important than
ever. 2
Pharmaceutical data mining may be described, in part, as the business
of collecting information relating to prescribers’ (e.g. doctors, dentists, and
nurse practitioners) prescribing habits. This information is then sold to
other companies that use the information in their business. A specific
example of this practice entails pharmaceutical data mining companies 3
collecting prescribing data from pharmacies. The data mining companies
then distill the data to determine the prescribing patterns of individual
* Dr. Michael Heesters, PharmD is a practicing pharmacist and, at the time of this
writing, a law student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Dr. Heesters would
like to thank the following people for their opinions surrounding the issue discussed herein:
Dr. Katie Wang, Dr. Trevor Buchanan, Dr. Bernardo St. Jacjon, and Trent Green.
1. Indranil Bose & Radha K. Mahapatra, Business Data Mining—A Machine Learning
Perspective, 39 INFO. & MGMT. 211, 211 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Pharmaceutical data mining companies prefer to be referred to as “health
information publishers,” however, even though this characterization may be more precise, I
will refer to them throughout this article as either pharmaceutical data mining firms, or
simply data miners. See IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, No. CV-07-127-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94268, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 21 2007) (indicating that pharmaceutical data mining
companies have a preferred nomenclature of “health information publishers”).

789

790

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

prescribers. Pharmaceutical companies then buy this information, which
allow them to better target their sales force. 4 This specific data mining
practice proliferated because it has shown great potential to allow
pharmaceutical companies to increase their marketing efficiency and
ultimately their profits.
As can be imagined, owing to the volatile public image of the
pharmaceutical industry 5 coupled with the perceived importance of the
privacy of health information by the general public, legislatures have found
problems with this business practice. In June 2006, New Hampshire was
the first state to pass a statute curbing this practice. The statute provided
that “prescription information shall not be used, transferred, licensed, or
sold for any commercial purpose.” 6 A sponsor of this bill opined that
“[d]rug companies are peering into physician’s brains without any
permission from them.” 7 It should be noted that the prescription
information that was being bought and resold had no patient identifying
features, 8 and that technically once a prescription is filled by a pharmacy it
becomes the property of the pharmacy. 9 Furthermore, the data mining
companies that purchased this information combined it with data (i.e.,
prescriber DEA numbers) voluntarily sold to them by the American
Medical Association 10 (AMA) in order to “create detailed records on how
700,000 U.S. doctors prescribe any of 10,000 drugs.” 11 Despite the AMA’s
acquiescence in this specific data mining practice, the New Hampshire
statute became law and attached a possible criminal penalty. 12
The data mining companies then filed a lawsuit to prevent this
intrusion into their business. IMS Health and Verispan LLC contended that
their First Amendment Rights were impermissibly restricted. In the first
trial considering this issue, IMS Health v. Ayotte, the Honorable Judge Paul
4. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 28 STATE HEALTH NOTES: VITAL SIGNS FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/health/shn/shn496.pdf.
5. See Doug Bandow, Demonizing Drug Makers the Political Assault on the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 475 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2003), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa475.pdf.
6. See H.B. 1346, 2006 Gen. Court, 159th Sess. (N.H 2006).
7. STATE HEALTH NOTES, supra note 4, at 1.
8. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D.N.H. 2007).
9. Therefore, because the prescription is not the property of the doctor, it seems unfair
to characterize the conduct of the pharmaceutical companies as “peering into physician’s
brains.” See White v. McComb City Drug Co., 38 So. 739, 740-41 (Miss. 1905) (indicating
that once a prescription has been filled the prescriber no longer has a property right to the
prescription).
10. The American Medical Association has a stated mission of “promot[ing] the art and
science of medicine and the betterment of public health.” AMA Mission, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/1815.html.
11. STATE HEALTH NOTES, supra note 4, at 1.
REV.
STAT.
ANN.
§
358-A:6
(2008),
available
at
12. N.H.
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/xxxi/358-a/358-a-mrg.htm.
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Barbadoro from the District of New Hampshire agreed, holding that
“alternatives exist that would achieve the State’s interest as well as or
better without restricting speech.” 13 This was not the end of the
controversy. The New Hampshire Attorney General appealed to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard the case during the summer of 2007,
and overturned the District Court’s decision by finding that the law
regulated “conduct, not speech.” 14
During the summer of 2007, Maine passed a very similar statute,
except that it allowed prescribers to opt out from allowing pharmaceutical
companies to use their prescribing information to market their products. 15
IMS Health, Verispan LLC, and Source Healthcare Analytics promptly
filed suit claiming a First Amendment violation, which has recently been
resolved at the trial court level. Moreover, numerous other states have
statutes that similarly restrict the sale of prescription drug data that are
currently pending in legislative committees. 16 This issue will likely
continue until states find an acceptable legal limit to place upon the data
mining companies or a dramatic change in the culture of the medical
community occurs. 17
This comment will primarily focus on the nexus between the legal
issues surrounding pharmaceutical data mining and the effect it may have
on businesses that are closely connected to this practice, by using the New
Hampshire case as the starting point in the analysis. The policy
implications of protecting pharmacy related information, along with
potential solutions to the perceived data mining problem, will also be
discussed.
Part I will discuss data mining in general and the pharmaceutical
industry in particular. Part II will discuss the legal issues surrounding data
mining. More specifically, Part II will discuss commercial free speech,
IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, IMS Health, Inc. v. Rowe, and some state
statutes designed to limit pharmaceutical data mining. Part II will
comment on the data mining statutes, the outcome of the aforementioned
cases, the potential effects of limiting data mining on pharmaceutical
companies and potential Constitutional solutions to the data mining issue.

13. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. at 183.
14. IMS Health v. Ayotte, No. 07-1945, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *4 (1st Cir.
Nov. 18, 2008).
15. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E, 8704, 8713 (2007).
16. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Additional State Information,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/imshealth/.
17. A “dramatic change in the culture of the medical community” specifically means
that prescribers, if they truly do not wish to see pharmaceutical sales representatives, must
make it apparent to the pharmaceutical industry by refusing to interact with the
pharmaceutical sales representatives.
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DATA MINING AND ITS EFFECT ON BUSINESS

Data mining is typically thought of as essential to the modern day
consumer-oriented business. 18 However, many other entities besides
private firms pay for and use data that is compiled by data mining
companies. For instance, the federal government uses data mining
techniques to collect information from airlines concerning possible terrorist
activity. 19 In fact, in 2000, the Justice Department and the Internal
Revenue Service both had contracts with ChoicePoint 20 for at least eight
million dollars. 21 Even the American Civil Liberties Union, a group that
typically advocates for protection of consumer privacy, has engaged data
mining firms to determine characteristics of their donors, such as “an
individual’s wealth, holdings in public corporations, other assets, and
philanthropic interests.” 22 Private companies also highly value consumer
data. As of 2004, Wal-Mart had approximately 460 terabytes 23 of
information stored at their Bentonville headquarters. 24 Target also amasses
consumer data partly through the use of its proprietary Visa credit card. 25
The trend towards increasing business efficiency and competitiveness
by analyzing information has led to niche companies that provide analysis
of the vast reams of data that firms gather throughout the course of their
business. The need for this business service has in turn led to production of
large profits for data collection and analysis companies. IMS Health, a
company whose business model centers around health information, had a

18. See Stacy Cowley, Data Mining, ITWorld.com (Aug. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.itworld.com/App/110/050805datamining/ (indicating that consumer focused
companies with sizable caches of information on current and future customers, such as WalMart and pharmaceutical companies, use data mining technology).
19. See Drew Shenkman, Comment, Flying the Not-so-private Skies: How Passengers'
Personal Information Privacy Stopped At The Airplane Door, And What (If Anything) May
Be Done To Get It Back, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 667, 668-69 (2007).
20. ChoicePoint is a firm that “provides information, analysis and distribution solutions
to advance the efforts of law enforcement, public safety, healthcare, child support
enforcement,
entitlement
and
other
public
agencies.”
ChoicePoint,
http://www.choicepoint.com (last visited May 11, 2009).
21. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002).
22. See Stephanie Strom, A.C.L.U.’s Search for Data on Donors Stirs Privacy Fears,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A1 (noting that “the American Civil Liberties Union is using
sophisticated technology to collect a wide variety of information about its members and
donors in a fund-raising effort that has ignited a bitter debate over its leaders' commitment
to privacy rights”).
23. For perspective, personal computers typically contain approximately 1-3 gigabytes,
whereas, a single terabyte is 1 trillion bytes or 1000 gigabytes.
24. Constance Hays, What They Know About You, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at BU1.
25. Id.
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revenue of $1.96 billion in 2006; 26 ChoicePoint, which is a diversified data
mining company, had a revenue of $1.1 billion. 27 Furthermore, QForma
Inc., a small start-up data collection company, has grown from a revenue of
$40,000 in 2000 to $2.1 million in 2004. 28 In fact, the chairman of Qforma
noted that he has “12 large pharmaceutical companies as clients, up from
two years ago.” 29 Moreover, as data mining technology advances and
provides more accurate information, consumer sales companies such as
Wal-Mart may benefit by instituting efficiency measures, such as scan
based training. 30 Scan based training, which would represent a possible
apex of efficiency, is a form of just-in-time product distribution, where
Wal-Mart could theoretically make manufacturers of the products that they
sell keep the cost of the products with their company until the product is
sold. Therefore, Wal-Mart would “never take those products onto its
books,” and decrease approximately “$50 billion of inventory.” 31 This
would be possible, in part, due to the business efficiencies that data-mining
produces.
Data mining not only produces business efficiencies, but it protects
them as well. For example, by using data including 911 calls, police
reports, neighborhood demographics, weather, traffic patterns, and the
timing of sporting events, the Richmond police department was able to
decrease robberies at payday check cashing stores. 32 Moreover, Capital
One 33 uses data mining techniques to prevent fraudulent transactions, 34 and
Harrah’s Casino uses it to identify people with criminal records. 35
Data mining functions by employing what is generically known as
“business intelligence software.” 36 Firms that are in the business of selling
26. See IMS HEALTH, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007) (indicating that 1.96 billion was a
twelve percent increase over the previous year).
27. See CHOICEPOINT, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2007) (indicating that 1.1 billion was a
four percent increase over the previous year).
28. Kevin Robinson-Avila, Data Mining Firm Digs Roots in Pharmaceutical Industry,
BUS.
WKLY.,
Dec.
15,
2006,
available
at
N.M.
http://albuquerque.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/stories/2006/12/18/story11.htm.
29. Id.
30. Hays, supra note 24.
31. Id.
32. See Steve Lohr, Reaping Results: Data-Mining Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2007, at BU3 (indicating that a twenty percent drop in crime in Richmond
coincided with the institution of data mining techniques).
33. Capital One is a major banking corporation with $178.6 million of revenue in 2006.
See CAPITAL ONE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2007).
34. See Lohr, supra note 32.
35. Id.
36. Business intelligence (BI) software includes the computer programs and algorithms
that are used to find correlations in the data that company’s collect. “Many products claim
BI capabilities, but the end goal is to let users slice and dice the information from their
organization's numerous databases without having to wait for their IT departments to
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“business intelligence software” are considered “one of the hot markets in
technology.” 37 In fact, Microsoft has entered the business intelligence
market, 38 and Oracle offered $3.3 billion for Hyperion, which produces
business intelligence software. 39
These are just a few of the examples of the effect that data mining is
having on business and economics. Data mining is becoming so pervasive
in business that it has been noted that the only reason a company would not
employ data mining techniques is if the executives do not understand its
necessity. 40
It is obvious that data mining is revolutionizing how businesses
compete. Moreover, it is imperative that U.S. businesses be allowed to
compete in an increasingly global marketplace and not be stifled by
unneeded, over-reaching statutes, which increase inefficiencies without
remedying the underlying problems that they were intended to solve. This
is especially true in the pharmaceutical industry.
A.

Data Mining in the Pharmaceutical Industry

It is estimated that every time a pharmaceutical sales representative
visits a physician office it costs between $100-$150, without factoring in
any free fringe benefits given to the physicians. 41 $1.2 billion was spent on
direct-to-consumer advertising for the first 11 months of 1998 alone. 42
These expenditures coupled with research and development costs 43 and the
perceived failure of pharmaceutical companies to produce “blockbuster”
drugs, 44 implies that efficient marketing strategies are highly sought after.
develop
complex
queries.”
The
Free
Online
Encyclopedia,
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/BI+software.
37. Lohr, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Competing on Analytics: The New Science of Winning (Harvard
Business School Press, 2007) as stating that data mining is “mainstream” and that “[t]he
entry barrier . . . ‘is no longer technology, but whether you have executives who understand
this’”); see also id. (indicating that “most companies now have the tools to do the kind of
competitive analytics that only a relative handful of elite companies could do in the past”).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Peter W. Huber, Of Pills and Profits: In Defense of Big Pharma, COMMENTARY
21, 22 (2006) (stating that “research and development costs for new drugs can approach $2
billion”).
44. See Stephanie Saul, More Generics Slow the Surge in Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2007, at A1 (indicating that consumers are spending less on drugs because “as
nearly every big drug maker watches its best sellers fade away, there are fewer potential
blockbuster drugs waiting to take their place”); see also Stephanie Saul, Johnson & Johnson
Plans to Cut 4,800 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at C2 (stating that “[w]ith generic
competition looming for two of its blockbuster drugs and use declining for its drug-coated
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Data mining is one example of how a firm in this industry can become
more efficient.
The pharmaceutical industry uses data mining techniques in a variety
of ways, including profiling, classification, clustering, prediction and data
analysis. 45 However, due to the limited scope of this comment, only
prediction and data analysis will be discussed. Prediction in the
pharmaceutical context partly involves using past prescribing history of
Data analysis in the
doctors to better predict future behavior. 46
pharmaceutical context uses the inferences drawn from the data mining
research to determine the optimal course of action regarding future
business decisions. 47
By determining prescribing patterns through prediction methods,
pharmaceutical companies can see which doctors are writing the most
prescriptions and what drugs they are prescribing. A former drug retailer at
Eli Lilly described the data mining sales programs as giving “[doctors] a
score of 1 to 10 based on how much they write. Once we have that, we
know who our primary targets are. We focus our time on the big
[prescription] writers—the 10s, the 9s, and then less so on the 8s and 7s.” 48
By targeting doctors in this way, Eli Lilly optimizes the use of their sales
force by only “dealing with individual physicians who might give us the
biggest dividend for our investment.” 49 More specifically, Eli Lilly used
the collected data “to tout the virtues of [their] antidepressant Prozac to
doctors who favored the rival drug Effexor.” 50 Through this process, it is
apparent that pharmaceutical companies can achieve greater efficiency,
which allows the companies to “do more targeted marketing, which lowers
the total costs of its marketing.” 51
This efficiency is particularly important when it is estimated to take
ten to fifteen years and $800 million to $1 billion dollars to bring a
compound through the research and regulatory process. 52 Even with these
stents, Johnson & Johnson said yesterday that it would eliminate up to 4,800 jobs”).
45. See John J. Cohen & C. Olivia Parr Rud, Data Mining of Market Knowledge in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Proceeding of the Northeast Statistical Analysis Software Users
Group, available at http://nesug.org/proceedings/nesug00/ph/ph6007.pdf (defining the
various methods which the pharmaceutical industry employs data mining).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1 (noting that data analysis is “an excellent tool for weighing risk and
benefit”).
48. Christopher Lee, Doctors, Legislators Resist Drugmakers’ Prying Eyes, WASH.
POST, May 22, 2007, at A1.
49. Id.
50. Id. Note that even though Eli Lilly is promoting their drugs, the prescriber makes,
and is responsible for, the ultimate decision of which drug is prescribed to the patient.
51. Id.
52. See Next Generation Pharmaceutical, How Effective Document Management Helps
Pharmaceutical
Companies
Accelerate
Time
to
Market,
available
at
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enormous costs and an obvious need for efficiency, “about half of [the
money needed to bring a drug to market] is spent wooing legislators,
regulators, academics, expert review boards, medical journals, doctors,
patients, insurers, and jurors.” 53 The traditional counter-argument to this
assertion is that putting price and efficiency restrictions (e.g. curbing data
mining) on drug companies will have a chilling effect on the amount of
research and development that occurs in the pharmaceutical industry. This
may be true considering that private investment in pharmaceutical
development firms only occurs because investors expect a high rate of
return. 54 Without this investment, small pharmaceutical and biotechnology
firms would likely decrease the amount of research they conduct, 55 unless
the government made up for the shortfall by raising more revenues or
diverting money from other sources. Therefore, even though drug pricing
garners much media attention, 56 attempts at limiting data mining and the
efficiencies that it produces could significantly add to the overall cost of
development and the marketing of a drug, which in turn would decrease
pharmaceutical company profits and may decrease investment in the
industry.
Furthermore, because of the highly competitive nature of the
pharmaceutical industry, 57 firms are cutting back the number of employees
on their sales force. 58 This reduction of employees, coupled with the
competitiveness of the industry, requires firms to maximize the efficiency
of their sales force. 59 Data mining is a major tool for achieving this
http://www.ngpharma.com/pastissue/article.asp?art=271760&issue=225 (referring to data
from the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)).
53. Huber, supra note 43, at 22; see also id. (indicating a perception that “[a] genuinely
important new drug . . . sells itself" and that “Big Pharma ignores the drugs that matter,
wastes huge amounts of money corrupting the market, and passes on the cost to patients”).
54. See Judith L. Wagner, Should the Pharmaceutical Industry Be A Regulated Utility?,
24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 289, 289 (2005) (stating a “basic economic principle” is that “private
capital flows to R&D projects only when those projects offer expected financial returns high
enough to justify their risks”).
55. See id. (holding as false one scholar’s view that the companies themselves will
spend more money on development).
56. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, High Prices: How to Think About Prescription
Drugs, NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004, at 86 (stating that there is a “political uproar over
prescription drug costs”).
57. See Evan H. Offstein & Devi R. Gnyawaldi, CEO Compensation and Firm
Competitive Behavior: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 22 J.
ENG’G & TECH. MGMT. 201, 205 (2005) (stating that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
“operates in a fiercely competitive global market”).
2006
ANNUAL
REVIEW
40
(2006),
available
at
58. See
PFIZER
http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualrep0ort/2006/annual/review2006.pdf (stating that the
field sales force was reduced by 20 percent).
59. See, e.g., ELI LILLY AND COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2006 2 (2006), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/520676294x0x221585/4C4DCB78-EB454D3E-99C0-1C9ADC30A89E/English.PDF (stating that “all of the major sales
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objective.
Although the focus of this comment is on data mining in the context of
the legality and policy considerations of pharmaceutical companies using
prescriber information to better target their sales force, it should also be
noted that generalized data mining techniques are also used by the health
care industry to track adverse effects of drugs, interactions between drugs,
and vaccine side-effects. 60
B.

Backlash Against Pharmaceutical Data Mining

The conventional wisdom holds that “[d]octors object to gathering of
drug data.” 61 Many others, including New Hampshire State Representative
Cindy Rosenwald, have described pharmaceutical data mining as merely “a
money issue.” 62 The money spent to gather information is purported to be
wasteful because it encourages increased Medicaid spending on
prescription drugs. 63 However, it is difficult to imagine how a technique
designed to increase private firm efficiency, coupled with physicians’
ability to both choose whether to interact with pharmaceutical sales
representatives and freely prescribe their drug of choice, can waste money

organizations in our U.S. affiliate were newly constituted during 2006” in order to avoid “a
system built around individual products and overlapping coverage of the same doctors”).
60. See Anne Trontell, Expecting the Unexpected—Drug Safety, Pharmacovigilance,
and the Prepared Mind, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED 1385-1387 (2004) (discussing
“pharmacovigilance” and the effect that data mining is having on reducing pharmaceutical
related adverse effects in several countries); see also Lee, supra note 48, at A1 (indicating
that the data may be used “to help determine whether physicians prescribing a particular
high-risk drug have undergone required training about the medicine” and that “[t]he
information helps companies, federal health agencies and others educate physicians about
drugs, track whether prescribing habits change in response to continuing medical education
programs, and promote higher-quality care”).
61. See Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2006, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/04/business/04prescribe.html
(describing how data mining is “virtually unknown to consumers” and “[a]rmed with such
data, a drug sales representative can pressure a doctor to write more prescriptions for a
name-brand medicine or fewer orders for a competitor's drug”).
62. Id.
63. However, Medicaid maximization strategies that states employ to garner a higher
federal match are likely to be more wasteful. See Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Restoring
Fiscal Integrity to Medicaid Financing?, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1469-80 (2007); see also Tim
M. Henderson, Financing: Intragovernmental Transfers and Other Special Financing
Mechanisms (American Academy of Family Physicians Memo), available at
http://www.aafp.org/online/etc/medialib/aafp_org/documents/policy/state/medicaidfinancing-igt.Par.0001.File.tmp/stateadvocacy_MedicaidFinancingIGT.pdf (describing New
Hampshire as one of sixteen states that had “some form of local financing matching
requirement” which is a state Medicaid maximization policy to transfer federal Medicaid
dollars for other uses, such as, to make up for “state budget shortfalls for other programs or
to draw down additional federal Medicaid dollars”).
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by “forcing” doctors to prescribe brand name medications. Nevertheless,
the AMA continues to sell prescriber information to data collecting
companies. 64 However, due to the aforementioned backlash, the AMA has
instituted the Prescribing Data Restriction Program, which allows
prescribers to request that their information not be transmitted to
pharmaceutical companies (i.e., “opt out”). 65
This means that physicians now have the option to request that their
identifying information not be transmitted to pharmaceutical sales teams. 66
This program, coupled with physicians’ continued power to prescribe drugs
that they alone choose and ability to limit pharmaceutical sales
representatives from their office, 67 would seem to imply that doctors do not
need additional legal protection that hinders pharmaceutical marketing
efficiency and is arguably an unconstitutional violation of commercial free
speech. Despite these institutional safeguards, some states have acted
legislatively to protect their patients from the “abuses” of pharmaceutical
data mining. 68
II.

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT FIRST AMENDMENT LAW

Commercial free speech can be narrowly defined as speech that
“propose[s] a commercial transaction.” 69 Another definition of commercial
speech is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.” 70 The Supreme Court has enumerated a test to determine
whether speech is properly characterized as commercial or not. The threepart test asks: (1) whether the speech is an advertisement of some form; (2)
whether it refers to a specific product; and (3) whether the speaker has an

64. See Robert Restuccia & Lydia Vaias, Prescription Mining Raises Millions for
Doctors’ Group, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 25, 2007, at B9 (noting that “[i]n 2005, the AMA
made more than $44 million from the sale of database products, approximately 16 percent of
its budget”).
65. See id. (stating that “[t]he program does not bar the sale of prescriber information to
pharmaceutical companies; it merely requests and then relies on the industry to prevent the
transmission of this data to its sales teams”).
66. See id. (noting that the Prescribing Data Prescription Program is utilized by “less
than 1 percent of doctors”).
67. See Benjamin Brewer, Stopping Drug Reps At the Door, WSJ, Aug. 16, 2005,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112405319132212657.html?mod=USBusiness-News (describing a physician that purposefully choose to ban pharmaceutical sales
representatives from his office due to the increased amount of “unscheduled interruptions”).
The physician also noted that “[o]ne down side to keeping drug salespeople out of my office
is that I might get fewer samples to give out to my patients.” Id.
68. See H.B. 1346, 2006 Gen. Court, 159th Sess. (N.H 2006).
69. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 748,
762 (1975).
70. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
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economic motivation for the speech. 71 While this may provide a
framework for most cases, it may not help define commercial speech
outside of advertising. The Court, however, has stated that the First
Amendment protects speech that has scientific value 72 and contains factual
information. 73 However, some forms of speech, including fighting words,
can be regulated by statute because they are a form of speech that has only
“slight social value.” 74
Once speech has been accurately categorized as commercial, the next
step is to determine whether it is constitutionally protected. The Supreme
Court expressly held that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.” 75
In Central Hudson, the Court conveyed a four-part test to determine
whether commercial speech warrants constitutional protection. The test
asks: (1) whether the protected speech concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the government’s interest for regulating the speech
is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
government’s asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is not more
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s asserted interest. 76 The
Court used intermediate scrutiny in the application of this test. 77
When determining whether a stated interest is substantial under
intermediate scrutiny, courts may not “supplant the precise interests put
forward by the State with other suppositions.” 78 To establish whether
regulation of commercial speech directly advances the government’s
interest, the party attempting to sustain such a restriction must
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
fact alleviate them to a material degree.” 79 The Court has also clarified the
fourth prong of the test by holding that governmental regulation of

71. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
72. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
73. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 421 U.S. at 763-64.
74. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that “the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances” because “[t]here are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”). This reasoning is
important because, as will be demonstrated infra, Judge Selya of the First Circuit Court of
Appeals relies on Chapinsky to determine that regulation of data mining firms’ activities is
Constitutional. See infra note 115.
75. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
76. Id. at 566.
77. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“we engage in
‘intermediate’ scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech”).
78. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
79. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995).
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commercial speech need not use the least restrictive alternative available. 80
More specifically, this prong requires “a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable.” 81
A.

IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte 82

Ayotte is the first case that demonstrates the arguable
unconstitutionality of overbroad limits placed upon pharmaceutical data
mining firms. In this case, the district court ultimately overturned the New
Hampshire “Prescription Information Law” that barred the “transmission or
use of both patient-identifiable data and prescriber-identifiable data for
certain commercial purposes.” 83
The legislative history of this statute indicated that it was intended “to
protect patient and physician privacy and to save the State, consumers and
businesses money by reducing health care costs.” 84 The healthcare costs
that the legislature was attempting to reduce consisted primarily of the
perceived overpayment by the state Medicaid program for branded drugs
when generic alternatives were available. 85 Furthermore, the Attorney
General, during the injunction hearing, further justified the statute by
submitting to the court a report showing how pharmaceutical companies
use prescribing data to target their sales force towards specific doctors,
which causes “public mistrust of prescriber decisions, increased drug costs,
and the provision of incomplete and/or misleading information to
prescribers.” 86 Based upon these and other findings the New Hampshire
Legislature concluded that the statute will “reduce the prescription drug
costs for patients, employers [and] the State Medicaid program.” 87
80. Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see also
Greater New Orleans Broad-Casting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177 (1999).
81. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 2380.
82. 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007). Note that the procedural posture of this case is
an action by the data mining firms for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction
concerning N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§318:47-f, 318-B:12(IV) (2006), otherwise known as the
Prescription Information Law. See also IMS Health v. Ayotte, No. 07-1945, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23701 (1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2008). Note that this is the appeal from the District
Court’s opinion.
83. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
84. Id. at 171.
85. See id. at 171-72 (describing a state representative’s testimony that a one-year
supply of Dynacirc, which is a branded medication, costs approximately $1,047, whereas,
Verapamil, which is a generic medication, would cost $162).
86. Id. at 172.
87. Id. at 171. It should also be noted that while this law may in fact help to minimize
Medicaid costs in the short term, the New Hampshire Legislature is discounting the effect
that an inefficient and less profitable pharmaceutical industry may have an innovation and
therefore drug prices in the future. These facts were brought to the attention of the court by
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Contrary to the State Legislature’s position, the New Hampshire
Association of Chain Drug Stores “expressed concern that the bill struck
too broadly and, among other problems, would prevent prescriptions from
being transferred from one pharmacy to another.” 88
The plaintiffs (i.e., the data mining firms) proffered several arguments
in an effort to save their business model. First, they argued that the statute
is subject to strict scrutiny because it is a content-based restriction on noncommercial speech. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the statute is
subject to intermediate scrutiny as commercial speech, and consequently is
not narrowly tailored to directly advance a substantial governmental
interest. The Attorney General, on the other hand, argued that the statute
does not regulate speech and therefore does not violate the First
Amendment. In addition, the Attorney General argued that even if the
statute does regulate speech, it is subject to immediate scrutiny and passes
the aforementioned test. 89
The court responded to the Attorney General’s arguments by
establishing that the First Amendment protects speech consisting of factual
information, 90 despite the Attorney General’s contention that the statute
“targets unprotected factual information, rather than constitutionally
protected speech.” 91 The court concluded that the law “restricts the
transmission of truthful information concerning the prescribing practices of
New Hampshire’s health care providers” and “is not exempt from First
Amendment review merely because it targets factual information.” 92 The
court went on to note that the statute prevents pharmaceutical companies
from using prescriber-specific data to direct their sales force towards
specific prescribers. Therefore, the First Amendment analysis was
particularly applicable because the statute “affect[s] both the speaker’s

representatives from IMS Health and Verispan. See id. at 173.
88. Id. at 173. Furthermore, the AMA expressed an opinion that “[t]he unintended
consequence of restrictive legislation is that companies that collect and process this
information may no longer be willing to spend the resources necessary to maintain these
data. Therefore, these data would no longer be available for those public benefits.” The
public benefits of information provided by data mining firms include, “(1) promoting public
health policy, (2) accelerating healthcare innovation, (3)driving best clinical practice, and
(4)monitoring drug safety and (5) clinical trial recruitment.” See American Medical
Association, The Unintended Consequences of Proposals to Restrict Disclosure of
Physician
Prescribing
Data,
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/432/rxamapositionmarch07.pdf.
89. The Attorney General also argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue.
However, the court dismissed this argument in part because the plaintiffs are “plainly
subject to prosecution as conspirators if they conspire with covered entities to violate the
law.” Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 174 n.9.
90. Id. (citing several cases including Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 175.
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ability to communicate with his intended audience and the audience’s right
to receive information.” 93
After the statute was shown to inhibit speech under the First
Amendment, the court had to determine the level of scrutiny. The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute regulated non-commercial
speech, and hence should be subject to strict scrutiny, because the statute
only restricted the use of prescriber-identifiable data for certain limited
commercial purposes (i.e., re-sale to pharmaceutical companies). Due to
prior precedent, the court then applied the Central Hudson definition of
commercial speech. 94 In sum, the court held that “the [Prescription
Information Law] is a commercial speech restriction under Central Hudson
because it restricts only speech that is ‘solely in the individual interest of
the speaker and its specific business audience.’” 95
Once it was determined that the law affected commercial free speech,
intermediate scrutiny was applied under the Central Hudson test. 96 The
Attorney General argued that protecting prescriber privacy is a substantial
governmental interest because “the State has a substantial interest in
lowering health care costs and limiting unwarranted intrusions into the
decision making process of prescribing physicians.” 97 The court made an
important observation that the Attorney General could not have claimed
that the statute protected a substantial information privacy interest. This is
for two reasons: First, “most information privacy laws protect the privacy
of personal information” 98 and the state’s interest in the protection of
business information is not equivalent to the state’s interest in protecting
personal information. Second, prescribers cannot claim an expectation of
privacy in their prescribing practices because they are well aware that this
information is transmitted to many different parties, including, “patients,
pharmacies, insurance companies, medical review committees, and
government agencies.” 99 This intuitively means there is no protectable
privacy interest in prescriber data that does not identify patients’ identities.
The Attorney General, in arguing that the state’s substantial interest is
comprised of lowering health care costs, claimed “that pharmaceutical
93. Id. Note that the speaker referred to is the pharmaceutical data mining firms and the
audience consists of the prescribers.
94. The Supreme Court defined commercial speech in Central Hudson as speech
“related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980). Furthermore, the Court in Central Hudson held that commercial speech regulations
ordinarily are “subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.” Id. at 573.
95. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 176. The court also noted in dicta that the same result
would be warranted even if a narrower definition of commercial speech were to be used. Id.
96. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
97. State’s Trial Memorandum at 20, Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007).
98. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 179 n.13.
99. Id.
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companies use prescriber-identifiable data to ‘pressure’ health care
providers.” 100 However, there was no proof that the “pressure” being
applied to health care providers was inappropriate. 101 Indeed, the court
noted that the Attorney General was not claiming that the pharmaceutical
sales representatives were using the data to relay deceitful information to
prescribers. 102 Therefore, the statute did not support a substantial
government interest.
The next issue, despite the lack of a substantial governmental interest,
was whether the statute directly advanced the state’s interests in enhancing
public health and restraining health care spending. The Attorney General
argued that prescription data mining makes pharmaceutical sales more
efficient, which allows pharmaceutical companies to have an easier time
selling their products (i.e., name brand drugs). Therefore, the sales of
branded medications will increase (which also increases pharmaceutical
company profits), and the state will end up spending more than necessary
on healthcare costs. This assumes, as the court correctly pointed out, that
“any increase in the number of prescriptions written for brand-name drugs
when compared to generic alternatives harms the public health and
increases health care costs because branded drugs often turn out to be more
harmful than generic alternatives.” 103
However, the court reasoned that the Attorney General’s argument
was a “general claim” dependent upon the “unproven proposition” that
branded medications cause more injury relative to generic drugs. 104
Moreover, the Attorney General’s argument that prescriber data was being
used to target physicians who were prone to prescribe newer drugs was
“unpersuasive” and the argument that the statute contains health care costs
assumes a proposition that “is far from self evident.” 105 Finally, the court
insisted that even if the unproven allegations of the Attorney General were
true, the statute would still not advance the state’s interest in protecting the
public’s health. The court reasoned, “health care providers are highly
trained professionals who are committed to working in the public

100. Id. at 179.
101. Id. However, the court did note that the law’s legislative history indicated possible
prescriber coercion. This evidence of coercion was in part from a nurse practitioner who
received free coffee and donuts from a pharmaceutical sales representative. The Attorney
General did not present this evidence at trial and the court held that there was no “credible
evidence in the record that supports the notion that pharmaceutical companies are routinely
using prescriber-identifiable data to coerce health care providers.” Id. at 180 n.14.
102. Id. at 181.
103. Id. at 180.
104. Id.
105. Id. The proposition that the court was referring to was that the health care savings
resulting from the statute will not simultaneously compromise patient care in some
circumstances.
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interest.” 106 Therefore, prescribers are unlikely to act irrationally when
confronted with the truthful commercial speech that the statute targeted. 107
After rejecting the Attorney General’s claims regarding the first two
elements of the Central Hudson test, the court analyzed the third prong of
the test to determine whether the statute was more extensive than necessary
to achieve the state’s asserted interests. The court that noted the statute
does not differentiate between using the prescriber data to target physicians
based upon the need to deliver factual pharmaceutical information and the
use of the information to coerce physicians into prescribing certain drugs.
Because the statute lacked this distinction, it was overbroad and served to
impose “a sweeping ban on the use of prescriber-identifiable information to
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all detailing.” 108 The court
went further by offering several ways that the state could achieve their
asserted interests, while not unconstitutionally restricting commercial
speech. For example, the state legislature could limit gift-giving from
pharmaceutical companies, require more continuing education for
prescribers describing better prescribing practices, or implement a prior
authorization or preferred drug list for the state’s Medicaid formulary. 109
The court’s proposed alternatives center around the fundamental flaw in
Cindy Rosenwald’s and the rest of the New Hampshire State Legislature’s
reasoning. The court reasoned that in order to advance the state’s proposed
interests, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.” 110
Despite the thorough analysis of the district court, the case was
reversed on appeal. 111 The Honorable Judge Bruce Selya of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals wrote the majority opinion. Judge Selya first
discussed whether the data mining companies had standing. The court
concluded that the data mining firms’ standing was restricted to the data
mining firms’ specific activities, which included “the acquisition,
aggregation, and sale of prescriber-identifiable data.” 112
In deciding whether the aforementioned activities were speech or

106. Id. at 181.
107. See id. (quoting the Supreme Court in Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy that
“[B]ans against truthful, non-misleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on the
offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”).
108. Id. at 182.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 181 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
111. Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *59.
112. Id. at *19. Note that this does not include “the use of that information by
pharmaceutical company detailers to promote particular products to physicians,” which is
surely commercial activity. Id. at *14-15.
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conduct, the court noted that “[t]he challenged portions of the statute
principally regulate conduct, and to the extent that the challenged portions
impinge at all upon speech, that speech is of scant societal value.” 113 The
court conceded that the statute implicated speech, but only speech that is
primarily between doctors and detailers. This reasoning was enough to
doom the fate of the data mining firms because the regulation of conduct
(not speech) falls within “other species of speech-related regulations that
effectively lie beyond the reach of the First Amendment.” 114 It is important
to note that conduct that falls within the category of “other species of
speech related regulations” has a common underlying feature. This type of
statutorily regulated conduct originates “from a felt sense that the
underlying laws are inoffensive to the core values of the First
Amendment.” 115 Furthermore, the court defined their use of the word
“inoffensive” as meaning that the “other species” primarily “regulate
conduct and, to the extent that they regulate speech at all, that putative
speech comprises items of nugatory informational value.” 116 In other
words, the data mining firms’ business did not have to undergo First
Amendment scrutiny because Judge Selya had a “felt sense” that the New
Hampshire Legislature was merely regulating conduct, and that prescriber
information has “nugatory” value. 117
The court did not stop there. In an analysis of a hypothetical, the court
assumed, “arguendo, that the acquisition, manipulation and sale of
prescriber-identifiable data comes within the compass of the First
Amendment.” 118 Despite this hypothetical situation, the court ultimately
113. Id. at *26. The court further noted that “the challenged elements of the Prescription
Information Law principally regulate conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict
the ability of data miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information destined for
narrowly defined commercial ends.” Id.
114. Id. at *23. The court noted that the “other species” include restraints of trade,
communications in furtherance of crimes, statements or actions creating hostile work
environments, and promises of benefits made by an employer during a union election. Id. at
*24.
115. Id. at *25. Note that Judge Selya relies on Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572
(U.S. 1942), to make the point that the data miners’ commercial speech is not protectable.
However, Chapinsky involves the Constitutionality of the regulation of “fighting words” and
is only tangentially applicable to the commercial free speech at issue in the present case. In
addition, comparing the value of “fighting words” relative to prescription information seems
spurious at best.
116. Id.
117. Id. It should be noted that Judge Selya left the door open for pharmaceutical
companies to sue claiming a First Amendment violation. The court stated that, “[a]lthough
speech, protected or not, is implicated by the Prescription Information Law, it consists
primarily of communications between detailers and doctors—but no detailer or doctor is a
plaintiff here. Therefore, an adjudication of that aspect of the law must await a proper
plaintiff.” Id. at *28-29.
118. Id. at *31.
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held that “even if one assumes that those provisions to some extent
implicate commercial speech, they do not violate the First Amendment.” 119
In reaching this decision, the court applied Central Hudson. First, the court
indicated that New Hampshire had three stated interests, which included,
“maintaining patient and prescriber privacy, protecting citizens’ health
from the adverse effects of skewed prescribing practices, and cost
containment.” 120 In finding that cost containment was a substantial state
interest, the court dramatically reasoned that “[f]iscal problems have
caused entire civilizations to crumble.” 121 Therefore, the State had met part
of the Central Hudson test.
For the next part of the Central Hudson test, the court had to decide
whether the Prescription Information Law directly advanced the goal of
cost containment. Judge Selya found that the State provided sufficient
evidence to show that the statute leads to better healthcare cost
containment. 122 He then rebutted the district court’s reasoning 123 by
concluding that, even though some branded pharmaceuticals may produce
better clinical results, this, in and of itself, is “too flimsy a hook on which
to hang a conclusion that a decrease in the prescription of brand-name
drugs would be unlikely to yield a net diminution in health care costs.” 124
In chastising the district court’s insistence that the New Hampshire
Attorney General actually present solid evidence on the Prescription
Information Law net health care costs, Judge Selya noted that New
Hampshire was in the “vanguard” when “formulating public policy . . . to
deny detailers access to prescribing histories,” and therefore the District
Court was found “to demand too much.” 125 Despite the lack of evidence
119. Id. at *49-50.
120. Id. at *33. It is important to note that the court decided to restrict their analysis to
only cost containment. Id.
121. Id. at *33.
122. More specifically, Judge Selya stated that there was “competent evidence that
detailing increases the prescription of brand-name drugs, that brand-name drugs tend to be
more expensive, that detailers’ possession of prescribing histories heightens this exorbitant
effect, that many aggressively detailed drugs provide no benefit vis-à-vis their far cheaper
generic counterparts, and that detailing had contributed to pharmaceutical scandals
endangering both the public health and the public coffers.” Id. at *41.
123. Recall that the district court concluded that the Attorney General made a flawed
assumption that “any health care cost savings that will result from a ban on the use of
prescriber-identifiable data can be achieved without compromising patient care.” Id. at *39.
124. Id. at *41.
125. Id. at *42-43. It should be noted that it seems inappropriate, over the long-term, for
a state legislature to routinely pass new legislation that lacks substantial evidentiary support
(although, according to Judge Selya it is legally sufficient when a state is in the
“vanguard”). Furthermore, as the New Hampshire Legislature garners the appropriate
evidence to support their new policy (which they will presumably accomplish), it is not
apparent they will alter the Prescription Information Law if the evidence proves
contradictory.
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supporting the cost containment theory, the court decided to give the New
Hampshire Legislature sufficient “elbow room” to find that the
“Prescription Information Law is reasonably calculated to advance its
substantial interest in reducing overall health care costs.” 126
For the final Central Hudson question, the court had to determine
whether the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve the
government’s interest. To justify the New Hampshire Legislature, the
court stated that “[t]he Prescription Information Law was a targeted
legislative response to a particular problem that had proven resistant to a
number of different regulatory approaches.” 127 In particular, Judge Selya
thought that it was impractical for New Hampshire “to retool” its Medicaid
formulary to make brand name drugs non-preferred and available only if a
physician consults with a pharmacist. Furthermore, the court noted that
this policy would “make no inroads with respect to privately insured
patients.” 128 What the court apparently failed to realize is that the New
Hampshire Medicaid system already has a preferred and non-preferred
formulary, which is segregated precisely as the district court suggested. 129
Moreover, private insurance plans follow the same structure in order to
minimize cost. Finally, when a doctor prescribes a non-preferred drug, the
pharmacist and doctor typically consult as to what other options are
available and whether or not a prior authorization 130 needs to be obtained
from the insurer. 131 Therefore, the court failed to realize that the “crude
attempt to remedy the compromised prescribing habits of physicians after
the fact” is the precise system that doctors and pharmacists already operate
in. 132 However, the court tried to explain itself by noting that even though
126. Id. at *45.
127. Id. at *46. However, this only begs the question as to why a regulatory approach
was needed at all.
128. Id. at *48.
129. New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services Preferred Drug List,
available
at
http://www.dhhs.state.nh.us/NR/rdonlyres/eenpjx5ovw5xenxiv65oe5fdha56vob2enswz2bs
mpvjhcgzmcdmzxacx6m4kbcmbhlzg6sn3lh3mywotimde. Notice that the preferred drugs
are predominantly generic and the non-preferred are predominantly brand.
130. A prior authorization is, “[i]n pharmacy, a cost-containment procedure that requires
a prescriber to obtain permission to prescribe a medication prior to prescribing it.”
MedicineNet.com, http://www.medterms.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2009).
131. “When a private insurance company or Medicaid rejects a prescription I will call
the doctor. Sometimes the doctor and I will discuss changing the prescription to a drug that
is covered, and other times the doctor will submit a prior authorization form in order to get
the private insurer or Medicaid to cover the drug. Either way, under the present system, the
doctor has to take extra time to deal with the prescribed drug that is not covered by the
patient’s insurance due to the private insurer or Medicaid having a preferred and nonpreferred drug list.” Interview with Dr. Katie Wang, Pharmacy Manager, CVS (Nov. 20,
2008).
132. Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701, at *48.
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a preferred and non-preferred formulary, which is already in place, would
presumably contain costs, the Prescription Information Law was enacted
“not only to lower costs but also to prevent detailers from exerting so much
influence over physicians’ prescribing habits.” 133 With this justification,
the court erratically departed from their cost containment analysis and
presumably provided a sufficient justification as to why the Prescription
Information Law is no more restrictive than necessary. It should be noted
that the court may have veered from the cost containment analysis because
the district court suggested several adequate remedies for the over-breath of
the Prescription Information Law and exposed the government’s asserted
cost containment interest as merely nugatory.
The court continued to summarily reject the plaintiff’s contention that
the statute was void for vagueness and unconstitutional under the dormant
commerce clause. In their analysis, several concessions were made to the
data mining firms. First, the court noted that data mining firms may sell
prescriber data to pharmaceutical firms “for research or for recruiting
physicians to participate in clinical trials of newly developed drugs.” 134
Therefore, if data mining firms sell the prescriber data for permissible
purposes, they cannot be held liable for impermissible uses of the data
further downstream by the pharmaceutical companies. Nevertheless, the
court provided a caveat that data purchased by pharmaceutical companies
for research purposes cannot then be used for targeted detailing. 135
However, the court refused to address whether a pharmaceutical company
can be liable for data properly acquired, which is then used to target
physicians. 136 Thus, data mining firms will not be held liable if prescribing
data is collected for permissible uses. However, using permissibly
collected data for impermissible uses is a violation of the Prescription
Information Law, yet the court did not address pharmaceutical company
liability. Consequently, it is a mystery as to who is liable for impermissible
uses of permissibly collected data.
Second, while rejecting the plaintiff’s dormant commerce clause
argument, the court noted that the Prescription Information Law “may not
accomplish very much” because prescriber data is permitted to be
transferred “to out-of-state facilities where it can then be aggregated and
sold legally to others.” 137 The court then punted the ultimate question as to
whether that information can then be used in New Hampshire to other
courts. 138 Therefore, based upon the court’s analysis, data mining firms can
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at *49.
Id. at *53.
Id. at *52
Id. at *55 n.10.
Id. at *60.
Id. at *60 n.11.
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still sell prescriber information for permissible purposes, even if it is
ultimately used for impermissible purposes and can sell data for
impermissible purposes if it is sold outside of New Hampshire.
Several points of the dissent bear note. First, the dissent disagreed
with the majority’s standing analysis. The dissent believed that pragmatic
principles should aid in determining standing because the data mining firms
have every reason to aggressively litigate this case, even in the absence of a
pharmaceutical company as a plaintiff. 139
Second, the dissent questioned, “how can the majority make a
judgment about the low value of that speech in deciding that the Act
regulates only conduct and not speech?” 140 The low value speech referred
to is the acquisition, aggregation and sale of prescriber identifiable data,
which the majority deemed conduct, not speech. Therefore, it seems
paradoxical that the majority can “make a judgment about the low value of
that speech in deciding that the Act regulates only conduct and not speech,”
without considering the First Amendment implications. 141 Furthermore, the
dissent correctly indicated that the majority “never actually identifies the
specific speech component . . . from pharmacies to data miners and from
data miners to pharmaceutical companies.” 142
Third, the dissent held that, although the data mining companies have
standing, the Prescription Information Law does not violate the First
Amendment. The dissent agreed with the majority that the district court
held the New Hampshire Attorney General to a higher standard of proof
relative to prior precedent. 143 Moreover, the dissent agreed with the New
Hampshire Attorney General that cost containment was a substantial
interest that was advanced by the statute. 144 Interestingly, however, the
dissent concluded that the benefits that pharmaceutical representatives
provide are “largely achievable in other ways.” 145 For instance, “[n]ews
reports . . . would highlight truly groundbreaking new therapies,” 146 and a
representative from the New Hampshire Medical Society stated that “the
vast majority of physicians” become quickly aware of any “new miracle

139. Id. at *65-66. The dissent also notes that “[n]othing in the extensive record even
hints that the plaintiffs were unable or unwilling to aggressively litigate the First
Amendment issues at stake in the ‘downstream’ transactions between the detailers and
physicians.” Id.
140. Id. at *71.
141. Id. at *71. The dissent also indicates that “[t]he very elimination of the detailers’
ability to use ‘a particular informational asset’ restricts the message they are allowed to
disseminate and implicates the free speech concerns of the First Amendment.” Id. at *72.
142. Id. at *73-74 n.14.
143. Id. at *146 .
144. Id. at *151.
145. Id. at *154.
146. Id.
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drugs.” 147
The dissent’s analysis misses the larger point. The vast majority of
new pharmaceuticals are not “miracle drugs,” which would indicate that
many physicians would not be aware of the benefits of these new therapies.
Furthermore, only incompetent prescribers would be unaware of “truly
groundbreaking new therapies.” 148 It is much more likely that a competent
physician would be unaware of a new branded medication that benefits a
relatively small group of patients, compared to an older generic medication
that benefits the population as a whole. 149 This is precisely why doctors
and pharmaceutical companies need efficient marketing strategies—to get
the correct message to the correct prescribers.
B.

IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe

IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe was decided before the First Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned the district court’s opinion in IMS Health v.
Ayotte. 150 This case involves a statute similar to the New Hampshire
Prescription Information Law. The Maine statute differs in that it featured
an ‘opt-out’ provision. 151 This provision allows prescribers to file for
confidentiality protection. 152 If a prescriber chooses to opt out, pharmacies,
data-mining firms and other carriers are prohibited from using or selling
their information for marketing purposes. 153 The opt out feature does not
restrict data-mining firms from purchasing and selling prescriber
information for any purpose other than marketing. 154
The issues before the District Court of Maine were very similar to the
New Hampshire case. 155 In fact, the Maine court agreed with the New
147. Id. at 155 n.64.
148. Id. at *154.
149. See Huber, Curing Diversity, 18 CITY J. 4 (2008) (describing how the
pharmaceutical industry is increasingly producing drugs that are targeted towards smaller,
biochemically diverse subsets of patients).
150. No. CV-07-127-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94268 (D. Me. Dec. 21, 2007)
(amended, 523 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Me. 2008)).
151. Id. at *24.
152. Id.
153. Id. Marketing is defined as advertising, publicizing, promoting, selling a
prescription drug, influencing market share of a prescription drug or prescribing pattern of
prescribers, a detailing visit or a personal appearance, evaluating or improving the
effectiveness of a professional detailing sales force or a brochure, media advertisement or
announcement, poster or free sample of a prescription drug. P.L. 2007, Ch. 460, § 1711E(1)(F-1) (Me. 2007).
154. Id. at *25.
155. Indeed, the court opined that “[h]aving reviewed Judge Barbadoro’s well-reasoned
opinion, the Court concludes that it ‘should refrain from writing at length to no other end
than to hear its own words resonate.’” Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *31 (quoting in part
Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 11 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996)).
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Hampshire court’s reasoning concerning the restriction of commercial
speech and the application of intermediate scrutiny. 156 The remaining issue
was whether the aforementioned opt-out feature passed constitutional
muster. The court applied the Central Hudson test 157 to decide whether the
opt-out statute was constitutionally sound. 158
Upon enacting the statute, the Maine legislature asserted the
government’s interests, which included improving public health, limiting
the increasing cost of healthcare, and protecting the privacy of patients and
The court specifically agreed that patient privacy,
prescribers. 159
decreasing the influence of drug representatives, ending the use of
prescriber comparisons for manufacturer profitability and efficiency
purposes, and enhancing the effectiveness of other laws were all substantial
governmental interests. 160 However, the goal of protecting prescribers’
prescribing patterns was described as “narrow.” 161 The court, holding that
prescriber privacy was not a substantial state interest, noted that
“[p]rescribers’ prescribing patterns are . . . dissimilar to the traditional areas
of privacy” and that prescribers already know that they “cannot prevent a
host of entities from reviewing their prescribing patterns.” 162 The Attorney
General countered that Maine has a right to recognize new privacy
rights. 163 This argument did not sway the court because the statute is
“essentially protecting prescribers from truthful information” and “there is
no evidence that by using this information, the detailers intimidate
prescribers or that the prescribers are vulnerable victims.” 164
Afterwards, the court analyzed whether the statute directly advanced
the government’s asserted interests. Even though the statute was found to
directly advance patient confidentiality, data mining firms were already
prohibited from selling patient-identifiable information. 165 Therefore, even
156. Id. at *31.
157. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
158. Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *32.
159. The Maine Legislature specifically listed the purposes of the law: (1) patient
privacy; (2) prescriber privacy; (3) decreasing the influence of drug representatives; (4)
ending the use of prescriber comparisons for purposes related to manufacturer profitability
and decreasing unnecessary marking costs; and (5) enhancing the effectiveness of other
laws. P.L. 2007, Ch. 460, § 1711-E(1-B) (Me 2007).
160. Rowe, 2007 LEXIS 94268, at *45.
161. Id. at *44.
162. Id. at *39-40. These other entities are composed of pharmacies, insurance
companies, patients, etc. It should also be noted that this argument is very similar to the
district court’s reasoning in Ayotte.
163. Id. at *41.
164. Id. at *42-43. The court also noted that the prescribers are “well educated
professionals” and “highly trained professionals” who are “entrusted to make complex and
dispassionate medical decisions based upon a plethora of information.” Id. at *42.
165. Moreover, the court noted that “[r]egardless of the opt-out provisions of the new
law, personal patient information has been and will continue to be encrypted and there is no
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though patient confidentiality was a substantial state interest that was
directly advanced, it was a moot point because the challenged provisions of
the statute did not affect patient privacy.
The court next addressed whether prescriber privacy was directly
advanced. In holding that the statute “only marginally advances the
governmental interest in prescriber privacy” the court noted that “the Law
does not restrict access to the opt-out prescribers’ prescription history.” 166
Therefore, the impact on prescriber privacy, namely prescribers who would
opt out, is “oblique.” 167
The statute did not directly advance the state’s interest of decreasing
the influence of drug representatives because “[a] Law that penalizes one
person for the misconduct of another cannot be using the most direct
approach to achieve its purpose.” 168 The court was referring to the fact that
the statute punishes data mining firms for the alleged indiscretions of
pharmaceutical companies. The court further noted that overly aggressive
marketing may already be covered under other Maine laws prohibiting
unfair trade practices. 169 Furthermore, the court recognized two seemingly
obvious facts that may have escaped the Maine Legislature. First, the
“most effective tool that the prescriber possesses to reduce the influence of
detailers is to refuse to see them.” 170 Second, the Maine statute will not
stop pharmaceutical companies from targeting physicians who use the optout provision, which will only make the pharmaceutical companies “resort
to more general, less tailored marketing, which was the source of prescriber
complaint[s].” 171
The asserted governmental interest of ending prescriber comparisons
for manufacturer profitability and decreasing unnecessary marketing costs
was not directly advanced because not all prescribers will opt out.
Therefore, even with the statute in place, prescriber comparisons will
continue and marketing inefficiencies and costs will rise due to the need to
“resort to more general, less tailored marketing.” 172
The asserted interest of enhancing other statutes received a mixed
reception. Specifically, the court found that the statute would encourage
prescribing on the Maine Medicaid formulary, but that the patient
evidence that the current practices of the PDIIs [i.e. data mining firms] and the
pharmaceutical companies have had or realistically could have any effect on patient
confidentiality.” Id. at *48.
166. Id. at *49-50.
167. Id. at *49.
168. Id. at *54.
169. Id. at *53. In fact, the Maine unfair trade practices statute was used to stop
inappropriate marketing of the drug Oxycontin. Id.
170. Id. at *50.
171. Id. at *52.
172. Id.
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confidentiality statutes were unlikely to be affected. 173 For many other
laws which the legislature claimed would see enhanced effectiveness, the
court simply did not have enough evidence to pass judgment. 174
In summary, the court determined that the statute directly advanced
the government’s interest in advancing utilization of the Maine Medicaid
formulary. The court rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that the
statute advanced the state’s interests of prescriber privacy, the influence of
drug representatives, prescriber comparisons, and marketing costs. 175 The
court also held that patient privacy was unaffected by the new law because
patients were already adequately protected. 176
Finally, the court analyzed whether the statute was narrowly tailored
to meet its stated objectives. 177 First, patient and prescriber privacy was
discussed. It was once again emphasized that the patient confidentiality
protections were “redundant” because of other laws providing the same
protection. 178 Moreover, the patient confidentiality provisions were not
being challenged by the plaintiffs, and “once the patient confidentiality
provision is excluded, the provisions of the Law that are constitutionally
challenged prohibit the sale of prescriber information, not patient specific
information, for marketing purposes.” 179 As for prescriber privacy, the
statute did not prevent dissemination of prescriber information; it merely
prevented one type of entity (i.e., pharmaceutical companies) from having
access to this information. 180 Therefore, the statute did not serve the
purpose for which it was intended.
Second, the statute was found to be more extensive than necessary
regarding the need to decrease the influence of drug company
representatives and to end the use of prescriber comparisons relating to
manufacturer profitability and marketing costs. 181 The court stated that
“[t]he Maine Law does not, however, ‘discriminate between beneficial
detailing and harmful detailing.’” 182 Furthermore, “[t]he law does not
prevent a detailer from giving gifts, even expensive gifts, to prescribers,
whether they opt out or not.” 183 This implies that the alleged influence of
173. Id. at *57.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *62
176. Id.at *57.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *58.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *62.
182. Id. at *63 (quoting in part Ayotte 490 F. Supp. 2d at 182). The court noted further
that “because some detailing is harmful and increases costs, the Law allows the restriction
of the use of truthful information that can be applied for beneficial and cost effective
detailing.” Id.
183. Id. at *58-59.
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drug company representatives could be lessened by measures outlawing
specific sales practices that are particularly egregious. 184 By doing so, the
Maine Legislature would achieve the same goal of minimizing
pharmaceutical company influence over physician prescribing, without
restricting commercial free speech.
Then the court proceeded to discuss the statute’s impact. The
plaintiffs argued that the cost of complying with the statute will be
“hundreds of thousands of dollars” and that “about 10,000 hours” had
already been expended to comply. 185 In addition, once in compliance,
doctors who opt out under the statute may be omitted from data collected
by the plaintiffs for investigative and regulatory purposes. 186 The Maine
Legislature apparently thought that the plaintiffs would continue collecting
information on all prescribers but differentiated between the information
sold for marketing purposes and the information sold for regulatory and
investigative purposes or both. However, due to the increased cost to the
data mining firms, “the likelihood also increases that the [plaintiffs] will
not collect any data on opt-out prescribers.” 187 The Maine Attorney
General argued that this is irrelevant because of the small number of
doctors that practice in Maine relative to the rest of the country. 188 Despite
this shortsighted argument, the court correctly noted that even though the
national impact would be slight, “the potential impact within the state of
Maine itself would be significant.” 189 Therefore, the court held that the
statute would have a significant impact on the data mining firms and that
the opt-out provision does not affect the constitutionality of the statute
relative the New Hampshire Prescription Information Law.

184. In fact, the court specifically indicated that Maine may consider enacting statutes
that restrict pharmaceutical sales representatives from giving free gifts to doctors. See id. at
*59.
185. Id. at 67.
186. See FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA and Lincoln Technologies, Inc. to Collaborate on
Developing Tools for Safety Data Mining, May 1, 2003, available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00899.html (describing how the FDA will
use data mining techniques to extract safety information concerning drug related adverse
effect patterns); see also IMS HEALTH PRESS RELEASE, IMS HEALTH ACQUIRES DATA NICHE
ASSOCIATES; COMBINATION CREATES COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE OF PRESCRIPTION INFO FOR
MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE MARKETS, March 3, 2003, available at
http://www.imshealth.com (follow “Press Room” hyperlink; then follow “News Releases”
hyperlink; then follow “March 3, 2003” hyperlink) (detailing IMS Health’s acquisition of a
smaller data mining firm that specializes in validating government-mandated rebates).
187. See Rowe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94268, at *71.
188. However, it seems unlikely that patients who reside and use physicians located in
Maine would feel the same way.
189. Id. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the Maine Legislature intended adverse
reaction data to not be collected from residents of Maine, despite the Attorney General’s
argument.
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Potential Statutes Affecting Commercial Free Speech

Several other states are considering restricting data mining firms from
having access to certain healthcare information. For example, the New
York Legislature has a bill in committee that prohibits the sale of
prescription information that identifies either patients or prescribers. 190 A
Texas state senator offered a bill modeled after the New Hampshire statute,
but this law did not make it out of committee. 191 Illinois also has a similar
bill that is stuck in the Rules Committee as of March 2007. 192 Other states
that have statutes pending include Arizona, 193 Kansas, 194 Maryland, 195
Massachusetts, 196 Nevada, 197 Rhode Island, 198 Vermont, 199 Washington, 200
and West Virginia. 201
Many of the statutes are stalled in their respective state legislatures.
This may be due in part to the state legislatures awaiting the final
disposition of the two cases previously discussed. However, now that First
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the New Hampshire Prescription
Information Law, it is only a matter of time before other states enact
unneeded regulation that will decrease the efficiency of pharmaceutical
marketing in an attempt to control an uncontrollable activity.
III. LIMITATIONS ON SELLING PRESCRIPTION INFORMATION INHIBITS
SPEECH AND WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
Laws that restrain prescription information inhibit commercial free
speech.
Notwithstanding the First Circuit Court of Appeals, two
independent district courts have determined that statutes that prevent the
sale of non-patient specific prescription information are unconstitutional.
190. S.B. A07645, State Assem. (N.Y. 2007). As of February 2009, the bill was in the
ways and means committee.
191. S.B.
1620,
80th
Leg.
(Tx.
2007)
available
at
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/billtext/html/SB01620I.htm; see also Minutes of the
S. Comm. on Health & Human Svcs (April 24, 2007), available at
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/80R/minutes/html/C6102007042409001.HTM; TEXAS
HEALTHCARE & BIOSCIENCE INSTITUTE, 80TH LEGISLATURE END OF SESSION SUMMARY,
available at http://biodfw.com/portals/0/EndofSessionReport80thSession.pdf (stating that
Senate Bill 1620 “died in committee”).
192. H.B. 1459, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007).
193. S.B. 1518, 48th Leg. (Ariz. 2007).
194. S.B. 229, 2007 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2007).
195. S.B. 266, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007).
196. H.B. 1005, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass 2007).
197. S.B. 231, 74th Leg. (Nev. 2007).
198. S.B. 0653, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2007).
199. H.B. 92, 2007 Gen. Assem. (Vt. 2007).
200. H.B. 1850, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
201. S.B. 434, 2007 Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2007).
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First, the prescription drug information collected by data mining firms is
factual, 202 and “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience.” 203 Admittedly, the Supreme Court has used varying
definitions of commercial free speech, but prescriber-identifiable
prescription information is precisely the information that has economic
value to prescription data miners. Therefore, data mining firms target the
sale of prescriber identifiable information to firms that purchase it for
completely economic reasons. Without prescriber identification, the
information would be worth much less to pharmaceutical companies, and
the economic interests of the speaker (i.e., the data mining firms), and the
audience (the pharmaceutical companies) would be inhibited. Furthermore,
even though the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the New
Hampshire statute regulated conduct and not speech, the appellate court’s
opinion was supposedly limited to only the data mining firms’ actual use of
the information (which includes aggregation, compilation and transfer of
such information). Therefore, inhibition of the use of the information by
pharmaceutical companies and individual detailers may, and is likely, to be
considered a restraint on commercial speech.
Even if prescription data is considered commercial speech, it does not
necessarily follow that it deserves constitutional protection. 204 Commercial
speech may be regulated if there is a substantial interest and the regulatory
Furthermore, “if the
technique is proportional to that interest. 205
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction
on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.” 206
Data mining firms have a protectable interest because state legislatures
that enacted the aforementioned statutes arguably did not articulate
sufficiently important interests (i.e., ends) to justify the overbroad means
(i.e., the statutes). 207 Both the New Hampshire and Maine Legislatures
claimed that they were instituting restrictions upon pharmaceutical data
mining in an effort to reduce the expenses of their Medicaid programs. At
first glance, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided, the statutes may
reduce healthcare costs. 208 However, another way to achieve the same
202. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64 (describing commercial free
speech as having a factual aspect).
203. Central Hudson, 474 U.S. at 661.
204. See id. at 563 (noting that commercial speech receives less protection relative to
other types of speech under the First Amendment).
205. Id. at 564.
206. Id.
207. This is meant to imply that the states’ stated interests were, for the most part,
substantial, but the statutes in question were significantly broader then necessary to achieve
the same policy endpoints.
208. This is primarily because if the statute works as planned, fewer brand name drugs
will be prescribed. Therefore, the savings will result from the difference between the price
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outcome would be to have a Medicaid formulary composed primarily of
generic drugs and mandate prior authorizations on whichever branded
drugs were offensive to the Legislatures. 209 More importantly, it is less
burdensome for those physicians who wish to keep pharmaceutical sales
representatives from visiting them to merely refuse to see them. 210 For
example, Cindy Rosenwald, the sponsor of the New Hampshire legislation,
is married to a cardiologist who apparently “had long known that he was
being targeted specifically by drug representatives to change his
prescribing habits.” 211 As a cardiologist being “targeted” it seems
reasonable that excluding pharmaceutical sales representatives from his
practice would produce a less intrusive result relative to passage of an
arguably unconstitutional statute that will make pharmaceutical sales even
less “targeted” and more chaotic. 212 It should also be noted that any
competent prescriber would not be coerced by free coffee and donuts from
a pharmaceutical sales representative. 213 Therefore, cardiologists, along
of the brand name drugs promoted by the pharmaceutical companies and the generic drugs
that the doctors would prescribe in their place. This savings is conditioned on the
assumption that if physicians are subject to less advertising of brand name drugs, they will
prescribe generic drugs, but it is also possible that physicians will merely prescribe other
brand name drugs.
209. See Mark V. Siracuse & Phillip J. Vuchetich, Impact of Medicaid Prior
Authorization Requirement for COX-2 Inhibitor Drugs In Nebraska, 43 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 435, 445-48 (2008) (indicating that a Medicaid prior authorization program
successfully reduced prescription expenditures on COX-2 inhibitors). It should be noted
that Maine is already employing “prior authorization as an incentive or a leverage device for
extracting supplemental rebates from manufacturers.” Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid
and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of Prior Authorization, 101 MICH. L. REV. 602, 603
(2002).
210. Furthermore, residency programs can limit access of pharmaceutical sales
representatives from meeting with the residents or institute greater prescribing controls upon
their residents. See Peter J. Peraud & Eric B. Kulstad, Another Resident Perspective:
Resident Education and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 45 ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 32,
33 (2005) (indicating that the “restriction or prohibition of pharmaceutical company
representatives is based on ethical standards,” but that this is a “paternalistic view” because
“research shows little difference in the degree of industry influence on residents versus
faculty”).
211. Sean Flynn, The Constitutional Battle Over State Regulation of Data Mining, THE
PRESCRIPTION PROJECT LEGAL ANALYSIS (August 30, 2007) available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/reglation_of_prescription.cfm (search for article under
PIJIP documents).
212. See Rowe, 2007 Lexis 94268, at *50-51 (indicating both that “the most effective
tool that the prescriber possesses to reduce the influence of detailers is to refuse to see them”
and that a prohibition on sales of prescriber information “does not prevent the
pharmaceutical companies from marketing their products and the companies may resort to
more general, less tailored marketing”).
213. But see supra note 101 (noting that there may have been evidence available, but not
presented in Ayotte, that a nurse practitioner was coerced by coffee and donuts). Moreover,
if a prescriber is allowing himself or herself to be coerced by mere coffee and donuts, the
primary issue seems to be with the prescriber and not the pharmaceutical companies.
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with most other doctors, may experience even more visits from sales
representatives if the “privacy” statute is upheld. This is precisely due to
the shortsightedness of legislation that does not prevent sales
representatives’ visits, but prevents access to doctors’ prescribing patterns.
Without access to sufficient information, the pharmaceutical industry may
resort to indiscriminate canvassing of all doctors in a particular geographic
area, instead of only sending sales representatives to specific doctors. 214
Moreover, despite Cindy Rosenwald’s opinion, the AMA has warned of the
possible negative externalities associated with statutes that limit
pharmaceutical data mining. Specifically, the AMA has expressed their
opinion that “[r]estrictions on the use of prescription information could
disrupt health care research and its corresponding benefits for patients,
government agencies, health planners, academicians, businesses and
others,” and that it is important to “not confuse confidential patient data
with physician prescribing data.” 215
Another problem with the Maine statute, as noted in Rowe, is that
pharmaceutical companies can bypass the statute by simply paying
prescribers to not opt out. 216 Therefore, if pharmaceutical companies
instituted this practice, it is probable that only prescribers that found
themselves excessively besieged by sales representatives would opt out.
This is yet another reason why the statute is overbroad and arguably
unconstitutional.
Proponents of anti-pharmaceutical data mining legislation also fail to
realize the alleged influence of sales representatives is diminishing, without
statutory manipulation, due to the changing dynamics of the
pharmaceutical marketing industry. For example, pharmaceutical firms are
already reducing their generalized marketing effort directly to physicians.
This is due to several non-regulatory factors, including the increasing
influence of payers, expiring patents, fewer new drugs with broad
indications, and more specialty drugs. 217 This is even more evidence that
Cindy Rosenwald’s legislation was, like so much other unneeded
214. The court noted the potential for this wasteful effect in Rowe. 2007 Lexis 94268, at
*50-51.
215. See American Medical Association, The Unintended Consequences of Proposals to
Restrict Disclosure of Physician Prescribing Data, available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/432/rxamapositionmarch07.pdf (stating further that “[t]he
AMA believes that physician prescribing data do not undermine patient confidentiality laws
because all patient data have been de-identified prior to collection and aggregation of this
information”).
216. Rowe, 2007 Lexis 94268, at *54 n.30.
217. Michael Steiner et al., The Continuing Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry:
Career Challenges and Opportunities, Regent Atlantic Capital White Paper, 1, 3-4 (Dec.
2007),
available
at
http://www.pharmawealthmanager.com/pdf/Pharma%20Paper%20ADVANCE%20PUBLIC
%20COPY%20Nov-30-2007.pdf.
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regulation, too late.
One final point bears noting. As healthcare receives more and more
attention, 218 it is increasingly important for the federal government and
individual state legislatures to refrain from infringing on the rights of
businesses that provide healthcare services in a hasty or ill-conceived
manner. 219 The statutes discussed in this paper exemplify how a good
policy objective (i.e., the need to control healthcare costs) can be followed
by overzealous attempts at mitigation. Healthcare is made up of a diverse
group of businesses that attempt to provide patient care efficiently in the
face of vast amounts of regulation. 220 Therefore, healthcare businesses
should not face non-safety regulation in excess of any other types of
businesses. 221 Haphazard regulation of data mining is an example of how
healthcare regulation has the potential to increase inefficiencies. 222
Moreover, state legislatures should be more concerned with incompetent
prescribers who prescribe drugs merely because they were advertised to
them, and not on the basis of a sufficient, medically valid diagnosis.
Curtailing data mining firms is not a way to correct this more serious
underlying problem.
The question then becomes how to efficiently limit pharmaceutical
data mining firms from allegedly interfering with prescribers and possibly
increasing healthcare expenditures. A potential solution is a cultural opt
out policy. For example, if a physician’s practice is affected by
218. This is due in part to the aging of the American population coupled with the policy
debate concerning healthcare financing. See, e.g., Centers For Disease Control and
Prevention, Public Health And Aging: Trends in Aging—United States and Worldwide,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5206a2.htm (stating that
“[i]n the United States, the proportion of the population aged ≥ 65 is projected to increase
from 12.4% in 2000 to 19.6% in 2030”); Lawrence D. Brown, The Amazing Noncollapsing
U.S. Healthcare System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325, 325-27 (noting that the “U.S.
healthcare costs have been in crisis for roughly 40 years . . . for several reasons, including
administrative overhead, high payments to providers and the practice of defensive
medicine”).
219. Note that even the First Circuit Court of Appeals commented that the New
Hampshire statute “may not accomplish very much.” Ayotte, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23701,
at *60.
220. Editorial, An Unhealthy Burden, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2007, available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9407716
(subscription
required) (indicating that as a result of federal and state regulation, the United States
approach to healthcare regulation results in a “massive drag” of $169 billion annually).
221. It can be argued that healthcare is different from other businesses, namely due to the
asymmetric information qualities inherent in the healthcare industry. However, this is
hardly an argument for preventing an efficient dissemination of pharmaceutical information
from reaching physicians by sales representatives.
222. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral
Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 537 (2007) (demonstrating how a diabetes mandate regulation
creates an inefficient moral hazard situation where “the passage of diabetes benefit
mandates worsens the health of diabetics relative to non-diabetics within mandate states”).
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pharmaceutical sales representatives and the physician does not wish to see
them, the physician should opt out by informing the sales representatives
that they are not welcome in his or her office. 223 If enough doctors become
upset at the pharmaceutical industry’s advertising model, a culture of
defiance will be directed towards pharmaceutical sales representatives,
which in turn will cause the pharmaceutical industry to respond by
advertising in an alternative way. However, the fact is that most
prescribers tolerate pharmaceutical sales representatives because of the
education provided concerning new therapeutic options and the provision
of free drug samples to hand out to patients. It should be further noted that
pharmaceutical companies have already begun moving away from directing
their marketing efforts to prescribers despite an unwise regulatory attack on
the business of pharmaceutical data mining. 224 In short, only social norms
within the medical and pharmaceutical community itself, not overzealous
and arguably unconstitutional regulation, will be truly effective in
preventing the alleged bombardment of sales representatives that
physicians supposedly encounter.
CONCLUSION
Data mining has been occurring in one form or another in many
industries without many consumers realizing it. Data mining firms are
continuously responding to marketplace demands 225 by developing more
powerful information-collecting technologies. However, a backlash may
occur as more and more consumers become aware of the information that
data mining firms collect. Data mining firms may be viewed with
contempt as consumers realize they are being specifically targeted due to
information collected from their economic activities. However, it is naïve
to think that the actions of pharmaceutical data mining firms can be
significantly curtailed without impinging on the First Amendment or
making the healthcare marketplace less efficient. As a result, state
223. There is already evidence that this is happening without any regulation. See SK&A
Patient Access Survey Press Release (Feb. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.skainfo.com/press_releases.php?article=71 (indicating that between June and
December of 2008, physicians who forbid sales representative visits rose from 22.3% to
23.6% and physicians requiring sales representatives to make appointments rose from
31.4% to 38.5%). As for prescribers that work in settings other than individual practices,
particularly hospitals, a drug formulary can be strictly enforced or the hospital can opt out of
pharmaceutical sales representatives visits, with the exceptions of specified times.
224. See Steiner et al., supra note 217, at 38 (describing how “the shift from the
“physician-prescriber” to a “stakeholder-payer” model will make the ability to influence
payers of paramount importance to pharmaceutical companies. It also will cause these
companies to lessen, though not eliminate, their marketing efforts to physicians”)
225. This demand occurs due to the ever-increasing competition between firms and the
resulting need to achieve as high a rate of efficiency as possible.
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legislatures should not act rashly when responding to the public’s concerns
about data miners. Furthermore, state legislatures must be vigilant to avoid
imputing a backlash against data mining firms that is not actually present.
As legislatures try to strike an appropriate balance, it must be remembered
that “our brilliant Constitution made us free enough to develop and
democratize free-speech technologies so cheap and powerful they can now
be controlled only by property rights and local culture.” 226

226. Peter Huber, Smile, You’re On Googcam, FORBES, July 2, 2007, at 110.

